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Recent debates about immigration policy in the United States can be 
framed by three events. The first is the passage of Proposition 187 by California 
voters in November, 1994. Known as the “Save our State” or “SOS initiative”, 
Proposition 187 was intended to prevent illegal immigrants in California from 
gaining access to social services, ranging from basic health care to primary 
and secondary education. The measure required local officials to cooperate 
with federal authorities in the enforcement of immigration law, from the cop 
on the beat to the teacher in the classroom. State employees were supposed 
to report anyone suspected of being an illegal immigrant to federal authorities. 
The measure passed handily by a two to one margin, garnering most support 
in rural and suburban areas, and among less educated white voters. However, 
Proposition 187 was never implemented because most of its provisions were 
deemed unconstitutional. In “League of United Latin American Citizens (Lulac) 
v. Wilson” (1995) a US District Court judge ruled that Proposition 187 violated 
the long established “plenary power” doctrine whereby the federal government 
has sole authority in making and enforcing immigration policy. Proponents of 
the measure argued that by failing to control the border with Mexico the federal 
government had abdicated its responsibility and that power should devolve to 
the states.
The second event is the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 (9-11) which 
changed the terms of the debate about immigration, shifting it from an almost 
exclusive focus on the economic and social effects of immigration to a concern 
over security and protecting the homeland from another terrorist attack. Even 
greater emphasis was placed on border control and advocates for a more 
restrictive immigration policy were given new ammunition with which to make 
their case, and the entire immigration control bureaucracy in the U.S. was reor-
ganized and given a new mission — to make sure that terrorists would never 
again be able to slip into the country undetected. In 2001, with the election of two 
border-state governors as President of the U.S. (George W. Bush from Texas) and 
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President of Mexico (Vicente Fox from Guanajuato), there were high hopes that 
an agreement could be reached between the two countries for sweeping immi-
gration reform. But these hopes were dashed by the 9-11 attacks, and immigra-
tion reform lost critical momentum. Still the US Congress tried unsuccessfully to 
tackle the immigration issue at the beginning of George W. Bush’s second term.
Hence the third event, which helps to frame contemporary debates over 
US immigration policy, was the passage by the US House of Representatives 
in December, 2005 of the “Border Protection, Anti-terrorism, and Illegal 
Immigration Control Act” (HR 4437), also known as the Sensenbrenner Bill, 
after its primary sponsor, Representative James Sensenbrenner, Republican of 
Wisconsin. The bill contained a number of controversial provisions, such as the 
construction of a new wall along the US-Mexico border to deter illegal crossings, 
and it would have made illegal immigration and aiding or assisting illegal immi-
grants a felony, punishable by stiff fines and imprisonment. Like Proposition 187, 
the Sensenbrenner bill was designed to deter illegal immigration. Even though 
the bill easily passed the House with a vote (239 to 182) largely along party 
lines (92% of Republicans in favor and 82% of Democrats opposed) it failed to 
become law, because the US Senate in 2006 opted for a different, more compre-
hensive approach to immigration reform that included measures for a guest 
worker program and legalization of the large population of illegal immigrants, 
estimated at 10 to 12 million. In the end Congress failed to pass immigration 
reform during the presidency of George W. Bush – partly because the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001 pushed immigration reform off the agenda for 
several years – but the immigration genie was out of the bottle.
As is often the case in immigration politics, the reform was initiated by the 
President, who early in 2005 proposed a comprehensive reform, only to see the 
issue become highly politicized once Congress took it up. The Sensenbrenner 
bill provoked the largest protests in the United States since the civil rights 
movement of the 1960’s. Millions took to the streets in cities across the country, 
marching to the rallying cry of “¡Hoy marchamos, mañana votamos!” (“Today 
we march, tomorrow we vote!”). Cardinal Roger Mahony of Los Angeles led 
some of the protests and called for civil disobedience, arguing that if the 
Sensenbrenner Bill became law it would make the most basic provision of chari-
table and religious assistance to illegal immigrants a crime. Asked if he would 
obey the law, he said that he would answer to a “higher authority”.
The “Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act” (IIRIRA) 
was the last major reform of federal immigration policy. It was passed by a 
Republican-controlled Congress in 1996 in part as a response to Proposition 187 
and the popular backlash against rising levels of (illegal) immigration. IIRIRA was 
signed reluctantly by Democratic President Bill Clinton, who vowed to roll back 
the more severe limitations that the bill imposed on the rights of legal and illegal 
immigrants. With the number of illegal immigrants soaring in the first decade of 
the twentieth century and in the absence of federal action, literally thousands of 
state and local bills were proposed with hundreds becoming law. Some of these 
measures involved Section 287g of the IIRIRA, which authorized local law enfor-
cement agencies to enter into agreements with federal authorities to arrest and 
detain illegal immigrants. Other laws involved state and local enforcement of 
sanctions against employers who hire illegal immigrants, penalties for landlords 
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renting to illegals, as well as laws designed to exclude illegals from receiving 
in-state tuition benefits at state-run colleges and universities, and from getting 
drivers licenses. In 2009 the Development Relief and Education for Minors 
(DREAM) Act was introduced in Congress to allow some illegal immigrant 
students, who were brought to the country as children but graduated from high 
school in good standing, to gain temporary residency and ultimately a green 
card, with the proviso that they attend college or serve in the military. Through 
executive action in 2012 President Obama moved to protect illegal immigrants 
who were brought to the United States as children (before their 16th birthday), 
an estimated 1.7 million people, who would be protected from deportation and 
granted two-year work permits — the so-called Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals or DACA program. And in 2014 Obama announced another executive 
plan to protect from deportation illegal immigrants who have US-born children, 
dubbed Deferred Action for Parents of Americans or DAPA. Both actions were 
subsequently blocked by federal courts following a suit filed by the Governor of 
Texas and twenty five other Republican governors against the Obama adminis-
tration, and the case (“United States v. Texas”) is currently pending before the 
US Supreme Court. As these recent developments in American politics illustrate, 
immigration is an issue that sharply divides the American electorate, and it is an 
unending controversy in US politics and society (Tichenor, 2002; Zolberg, 2006).
Yet despite the controversy and the soaring anti-immigration rhetoric in the 
2016 presidential elections, and unlike in other western democracies where 
immigration has transformed the political landscape (Norris, 2005), immigration 
has yet to emerge as a “wedge issue” in American national politics. How can we 
explain this disjuncture between large segments of the American public – which, 
according to opinion polls taken from 1965 to the present, wants illegal immi-
gration stopped, illegals removed, and lower levels of legal immigration (Fetzer, 
2000) – and national election outcomes which have stymied major immigration 
policy reforms? To address this question we need to put contemporary immigra-
tion debates into historical perspective, to look more carefully at how immigra-
tion has shaped and reshaped American politics and society in recent decades, 
and how immigrants and their offspring have become actors on the political 
stage, thus changing the nature of the electorate and the terms of debate. What 
we shall see is that public attitudes towards immigration, ethnicity, and race are 
constantly evolving and that they are more nuanced than a cursory reading of 
the headlines (and opinion polls) might lead us to believe.
The Historical Context: E Pluribus Unum
In 2004 one of the most respected political scientists of his generation, 
Samuel P. Huntington of the “clash of civilizations” fame, published what 
would be his final major work, a book entitled “Who Are We? The Challenges 
to America’s National Identity”. In this book Huntington argued that American 
national identity, and by extension US national interests, are threatened by a 
growing wave of Hispanic immigration, and that Mexican immigrants in parti-
cular are engaged in “la Reconquista” or a re-taking of territory lost during the 
Mexican-American War not through military conquest but through a peaceful 
“invasion”, the result of which has been to undermine Anglo-Protestant (Puritan) 
values of hard work, loyalty to the “founding principles” of the US Constitution, 
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and rule of law. Huntington decries the wave of illegal immigration of impove-
rished and poorly educated Mexicans and Central Americans, the rise of dual 
citizenship, bilingualism, and what he sees as the loss of a clear national identity 
and purpose – all the result of too much immigration. He begins the book by 
outlining three waves of immigration in US history, first in the mid-19th century 
with the Irish and Germans and continuing through the late 20th and early 21st 
centuries with Hispanics and Asians. He omits the first wave of immigration 
from the British Isles in the 17th and 18th centuries, because he views this wave 
as a period of settlement and founding during which the new American nation 
was created with a fundamentally Anglo-Puritan outlook.
Huntington’s argument underscores the enduring controversy over immigra-
tion as a force shaping and reshaping American society (Higham, 1955; King, 
2005). His critics accuse him of being a latter day nativist and “know nothing”2 
echoing the controversy in earlier periods of American history when immigra-
tion was seen as a threat to basic “American” values (Tichenor, 2002; King, 
2000). In the 18th century, for example, Benjamin Franklin was very concerned 
about German immigration in Pennsylvania, because he thought that the largely 
illiterate German peasants who were coming from a semi-feudal society had 
little understanding of what it was like to live in a Republic based on rule of law 
and individual liberty. Later in his political career Franklin changed his views on 
German immigration, as German-Americans became an increasingly important 
part of the electorate in Pennsylvania; and less than two centuries later a 
descendant of those German immigrants, Dwight Eisenhower, was elected 
President of the United States. It is important to keep in mind that immigration 
from the colonial period through the Civil War and Reconstruction (roughly the 
first hundred years of US history) was controlled by the individual states, to the 
extent that it was regulated at all (Zolberg, 2006). Immigration was largely driven 
by the demand for labor to fuel the fires of industrialization – as in later periods 
private employers were instrumental in recruiting immigrants  – by westward 
expansion, and by a seemingly unlimited supply of labor displaced by the indus-
trial revolution and the concomitant rural exodus in Western Europe.
In The American Kaleidoscope: Race, Ethnicity, and the Civic Culture (1990) the 
historian Fuchs argues that three ideas have dominated the American approach 
to immigration and citizenship. They are the Massachusetts and Virginia models, 
dating from the early colonial period, and the Pennsylvania model, which took 
shape in the early years of the Republic. He admits that these are “ideal types”, 
but he contends that traces of each model can still be found in contemporary 
debates. The “Massachusetts model” most closely conforms to Huntington’s 
ideal of Anglo-Puritanism (what might be called a White Anglo-Saxon Protestant 
or WASP view of American national identity). In this view immigrants are to be 
welcomed if they are willing to assimilate, learn English, and adopt the dominant 
religion and culture. In colonial Massachusetts that meant conformity to ascetic 
Puritan ideals, and in the contemporary debates Huntington clearly wants to 
2 The so-called “Know Nothings” were part of a secret political movement in the 1840’s 
and 1850’s who were opposed to the largely Catholic German and Irish immigration of 
the second wave. When asked about membership in the organization, members were 
instructed to say “I know nothing”. The movement had some successes in state and local 
politics but eventually fell apart largely because of divisions between its members over 
the issue of slavery.
275
American Immigration Politics
make respect for Anglo-Puritan values the basis for selecting and naturalizing 
immigrants. The “Virginia model” revolves around the demand for labor. In the 
early colonial period (17th and 18th centuries) the Virginia and Carolina planters 
needed stoop labor to pick tobacco and cotton. They acquired this labor initially 
through coercion — the forced labor of Native Americans and the enslavement 
of Africans brought to the New World in bondage. Since both groups were consi-
dered to be sub-human, no thought was given to their naturalization and assimi-
lation. Indeed many Europeans were brought to work on the plantations and in 
shops and factories as indentured servants with limited rights. We hear echoes 
of the Virginia model in contemporary debates about guest worker programs 
whereby foreigners are brought as bonded workers on a temporary basis with 
no right to settle or naturalize.
Finally, the “Pennsylvania model”, which Fuchs sees prevailing in the 
Congressional Act of 1790 establishing a uniform rule of naturalization, calls 
for equal treatment of newcomers, welcoming them to settle, live, and worship 
as they see fit so long as they respect the law and the basic values of the 
Republic. It should be noted, however, that the same act limited naturalization 
to “free ‘white’ persons of good moral character”, thus enshrining race (and 
to some extent class as it excluded indentured servants) into US immigration 
law (Fitzgerald and Cook-Martín, 2014). Still the first President of the Republic, 
George Washington, reflected an expansive ideal of citizenship when he said, 
“the bosom of America is open to receive not only the Opulent and respect-
able Stranger, but the oppressed and persecuted of all Nations and Religions; 
whom we shall welcome to a participation of all our rights and privileges”. The 
Pennsylvania model was reinforced and after the Civil War with the ratification 
in 1868 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which extended 
citizenship to “all persons born or naturalized in the United States”3. The 
Amendment was intended primarily to overturn the Dred Scott decision of the 
Supreme Court (1857) and to grant citizenship to former slaves, but in so doing 
it codified birthright citizenship with far-reaching implications for immigration 
policy (Kettner, 1978). Barely two decades after the end of the Civil War, the 
Statue of Liberty — a gift from one fledgling Republic, France, to another, the 
United States — was erected in New York harbor (1886); and it would become the 
most visible symbol of an open and tolerant America, welcoming immigrants 
from the four corners of the globe. Inside the pedestal of the statue is inscribed 
the most famous immigration sonnet in American history, The New Colossus, by 
Emma Lazarus, which reads in part
“Give me your tired, your poor, 
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, 
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore. 
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me, 
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!”
All three “models” have been present historically in debates over immi-
gration and citizenship, which have followed the unofficial national motto, e 
3 Section 1 of the Amendment states that “all persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the 
State wherein they reside”.
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pluribus unum (out of many, one). At times Americans, like Samuel Huntington, 
have been more concerned about the “unum” and the need to maintain a clear 
national identity and purpose; at other times Americans have hewed to the 
Pennsylvania model, showing a greater willingness to accept immigrants and 
celebrate diversity, the “pluribus”. As mentioned above, we can identify four 
waves of immigration in US history: the first from the British Isles before 1820 
was made up largely of the English and Scots who came for a variety of religious, 
political (many of the early English settlers were dissenters), and economic 
(the promise of land and a new start) reasons. The second wave beginning 
around 1840 and running through the Great Depression of the 1870’s was more 
economic in nature (the Irish were fleeing starvation and deprivation during 
the potato famine) while other northern and west European groups like the 
Germans and Scandinavians were mostly farmers and artisans, attracted by land 
in the vast expanse of the Great Plains. Because many of the newcomers were 
Roman Catholic, the second wave provoked an anti-Catholic backlash, which 
found its greatest expression in the “know nothing” movement of the mid-19th 
century (Higham, 1955). The third wave started in 1880 and continued to 1914, 
when the Great War brought an end to the transatlantic migrations. This wave 
proved even more controversial than previous waves, because it was ethnically 
diverse (King, 2000). Male Chinese laborers were brought into the west to build 
the transcontinental railroad and to work in the mines; southern and eastern 
Europeans flooded into eastern cities, and into the mid- and southwest, increa-
sing the Catholic and Jewish populations in these regions. It was during the third 
wave that the federal government began to assert control over immigration, 
starting with the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which, like Proposition 187 over 
a century later, was the direct result of a nativist backlash in California against 
a rising tide of immigration and a seemingly complacent federal government.
By the early 1900’s political pressure was again building to slow the rate 
of immigration. The Dillingham Commission (see Zeidel, 2004) was set up 
by Congress in 1907 to study “the problem” and to recommend new ways 
of selecting immigrants. The pendulum was swinging back in favor of those 
concerned about national identity (the unum), and the Commission report issued 
in 1911 concluded that the U.S. was threatened by the increasing number of 
immigrants from “non-traditional” source countries. The Commission called for 
literacy tests and — relying on the pseudo-science of eugenics widely accepted 
at the time — argued in favor of a racially-based immigration policy (Fuchs, 1990; 
Smith, 1997; King, 2000). The Commission concluded that immigrants from 
southern and eastern Europe had more “inborn socially inadequate qualities 
than northwestern Europeans”4. After World War I inflows of immigrants from 
Europe recovered briefly, but in 1921 Congress enacted the first quantitative 
restrictions on immigration and in 1924 passed the National Origins Quota Act, 
which restricted immigration to northern and western Europeans, essentially 
locking out all other nationalities. Inflows fell rapidly and the onset of the Great 
Depression in 1929 brought a halt to immigration. The foreign population was 
quite large in the interwar period, but immigration (inflows) would not start 
again until after World War  II. The 1924 National Origins Quota Act, based on 





a clear racial hierarchy, remained in effect until its repeal in 1965. During the 
turbulent decade of the 1930’s through the Second World War avenues for legal 
immigration were restricted, and the U.S. had no official refugee policy. Refugee 
admissions were made purely on an ad hoc basis, and many European Jewish 
refugees fleeing Nazi persecution were turned away from American shores.
Notwithstanding the wave of nativism, racism and restrictionism in the 
1920’s, the American political landscape was transformed by the third wave of 
immigration (King, 2005). Attention shifted from stopping immigration to assi-
milating immigrants. This was the heyday of Tammany Hall5 and big-city political 
machines in places like New York, Boston, and Chicago where first the Irish, then 
the Italians, and eventually southern and eastern European Jewish immigrants 
would come to play a larger role in urban politics. The Democratic Party was the 
major beneficiary of the support of the newcomers and Franklin Roosevelt would 
forge a New Deal coalition between working class, largely Catholic and Jewish 
immigrants in the north, and poor whites in the Protestant south. Even though 
the muscle of the big city machines was not enough to overcome nativist politics 
in the interwar period, Americans had found a new metaphor to describe the 
assimilation of immigrants: the “melting pot” was popularized in a play by Israel 
Zangwill which premiered in 1908. The notion of immigrants from many different 
cultures melting into a new society would become synonymous with immigra-
tion and the “American dream”. The protagonist in Zangwill’s play proclaims 
“Germans and Frenchmen, Irishmen and Englishmen, Jews and Russians — into 
the crucible with you all! God is making the American!” But all was not love 
and light in immigration politics following the third wave. In a dispute in 1930 
with a Congressman from New York and future mayor of New York City, Fiorella 
LaGuardia, President Herbert Hoover wrote in a letter to his fellow Republican, 
“the Italians are predominantly murderers and bootleggers [and you and your 
Italian supporters] should go back to where you belong [because] like a lot of 
other foreign spawn, you do not appreciate this country which supports you and 
tolerates you” (Baltzell, 1964: 30). In the presidential election of 1928, Al Smith, 
the Irish Catholic Governor of New York and Democratic candidate, would lose 
to Republican Herbert Hoover, but by winning the Democratic Party nomination 
he had broken an important cultural barrier, overcoming anti-Catholic and anti-
immigrant sentiments. Thirty two years later another Irish Catholic politician, the 
Democrat, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, would overcome the final hurdles to the full 
participation of Catholics in American political life.
Immigration Control and “Rights-Based Politics”
The first cracks in the National Origins Quota policy occurred during and 
immediately after World War II with the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 
1943, the launch of the “Bracero program” in 1942, and the arrival after the war 
of large numbers of refugees and war brides from Europe and Asia. These groups 
did not fit within any of the existing quotas (Tichenor, 2002). China was an ally 
5 Tammany Hall refers to New York City municipal government, which was controlled by 
immigrant political machines, particularly the Irish and Italians, throughout the 19th and 
well into the 20th century. Tammany Hall dispensed patronage jobs in exchange for votes 
for the Democratic Party.
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in the war against Japan, and Congress decided that the longstanding ban on 
immigration and naturalization of Chinese nationals was bad for the war effort. 
Chinese immigrants living in the U.S. were allowed to naturalize, but strict quotas 
on Chinese immigration remained in effect. The U.S. in World War II was leading 
the fight against fascism and the racist ideology underpinning it. The contradic-
tions of American immigration and refugee policy – not to mention segregation 
and Jim Crow6 – were increasingly anomalous and at odds with American foreign 
policy (Smith, 1997; Dudziak, 2000; Fitzgerald and Cook-Martín, 2014).
The War also brought new demands for foreign labor. The “Bracero program” 
was launched to fill gaps in the American labor market resulting from the draft. 
This guest worker program would have major long-term consequences for 
US immigration policy. The program allowed for the recruitment of tens of 
thousands of “temporary” workers from Mexico in the 1940’s, first in agriculture 
and subsequently in the railroad and transportation sectors (Calavita, 1992). 
It marked the beginning of large scale immigration from Mexico, which has 
continued until the “great recession” and financial crisis of 2007-2008 when 
the flows reversed and net migration from Mexico turned negative, with more 
returns than arrivals. Attempts were made to reverse the flows with “Operation 
Wetback” in 1954 in which hundreds of thousands of Mexican workers and their 
families, including many who were US citizens, were voluntarily repatriated or 
summarily deported to Mexico. The “Bracero program” remained in effect until 
its repeal in 1964 and the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965.
Also known as the Hart-Celler Act, the 1965 INA was a landmark piece of 
legislation, which repealed the National Origins Quota system, thus eliminating 
race and ethnicity – from the law on the books if not from the law in action – 
as the principal criteria for selecting immigrants (Fitzgerald and Cook-Martín, 
2014). The pendulum of immigration politics was swinging back in favor of 
greater diversity (pluribus) and tolerance. The 1960’s would see the triumph 
of the Pennsylvania model and the rise of what I have called “rights-based” 
politics7 (Hollifield, 1992). The relationship between individuals, groups, and 
the state was redefined through a process of political struggle (the civil rights 
movement) that would sweep away Jim Crow and racial discrimination and, in 
the process, expand the rights of immigrant and ethnic minorities. A new type of 
“rights-based politics” was emerging at every level of the polity, from partisan 
and interest group politics, to the legislature and executive, and especially in 
the federal judiciary, which became increasingly active in protecting minority 
rights and civil liberties. A similar trend can be seen across the western world 
(Hollifield, Martin and Orrenius, 2014). Beginning in the 1960’s, the courts would 
play an important role in immigration policymaking, restraining state and local 
authorities in their treatment of immigrants, helping to consolidate the rights of 
immigrants and minorities, and reasserting the plenary power doctrine (Schuck, 
1998; Law, 2013).
6 Jim Crow is a metaphor for the segregationist laws put in place during and after the 
period of Reconstruction in the American south. These harsh laws endured until the civil 
rights “revolution” of the 1950’s and 1960’s, which ended formal segregation of blacks 
and whites.
7 I first used this term, “rights-based politics” or “rights-based liberalism” in Hollifield 




The move away from the Massachusetts and Virginia models in favor of 
the Pennsylvania model of immigration and citizenship after World War II can 
be attributed to two political developments: the cold war and the civil rights 
movement (Hollifield and Wilson, 2011; Fitzgerald and Cook-Martín, 2014). Public 
opinion remained suspicious and downright hostile to immigrants and refugees 
in the 1950’s. Congress passed the McCarren-Walter Act in 1952, which made 
it a felony to “harbor, transport, and conceal illegal immigrants”. But, under 
the “Texas Proviso”, those employing illegal immigrants were exempt from the 
law. Employers, particularly the growers in the southwest, had enough political 
clout to keep cheap Mexican labor flowing into the US market. McCarren-Walter 
also loosened racial restrictions on immigration ever so slightly, but without 
repealing the National Origins Quota system. Reflecting the fear of communist 
subversion during the early years of the cold war, McCarren-Walter contained 
provisions for screening immigrants to catch communists and subversives, a 
move which was in keeping with McCarthyism and the new red scare. President 
Harry Truman vetoed the bill, calling it “un-American”, but Congress overrode 
his veto. Congressional efforts to placate xenophobic and McCarthyite groups 
made it difficult for the President to ease restrictions on refugees coming from 
communist countries (Tichenor, 2002). Immigration and refugee policy were 
important foreign policy tools and the President needed a freer hand to accom-
modate cold war refugees in particular. Ultimately the civil rights movement, 
which had as its primary objective to overturn Jim Crow and achieve equal rights 
for African-Americans, swept away the last vestiges of the racist and discrimi-
natory National Origins Quota system, leading to the most radical reform of 
immigration policy in American history. The INA of 1965 was passed on the 
heels of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Immigrants 
were among the most important beneficiaries of the civil rights movement, as 
laws designed to end racial discrimination against blacks helped open up new 
political and legal spaces (rights) for immigrant minorities, setting the stage for 
the fourth (and largest) wave of immigration in American history (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Foreign Born Population (Million) and Share of Total Population (%)
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The fourth wave began slowly in the 1970’s, in part because of the severe 
economic slowdown that was the result of two oil shocks and a steep recession 
in 1981-1982. But as the economy recovered in the 1980’s immigration accel-
erated rapidly, and by the first decades of the 21st century the foreign-born 
population (stocks) would climb to an all-time high of 35 million. The civil rights 
movement and the INA of 1965 had laid the political and legal groundwork for a 
more expansive immigration policy, but it was the soaring American economy in 
the 1980’s and 1990’s that propelled immigration to new heights. The free market 
policies of the Reagan and Clinton administrations made the U.S. increasingly 
immigrant-friendly. Demand-pull forces in the American labor market were 
strong and there was a relatively unlimited supply of workers in Mexico, Central 
America, and Asia ready to fill this demand.
Strange bedfellow coalitions of civil rights liberals (northern Democrats, 
many of them — like Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts — descendants 
of the second and third wave immigrants) and business-oriented, Wall Street 
Republicans helped to pass some of the most expansive immigration laws in 
US history (Hollifield et al., 2008; Hollifield and Wilson, 2011). The Refugee Act 
of 1980 incorporated the 1951 UN Refugee Convention into US law. During 
most of the cold war period, US policy favored refugees fleeing persecution 
in communist countries, whereas the Geneva Convention defined a refugee as 
anyone with a “well-founded fear of persecution”. Signatories of the Convention 
were bound by the principle of non-refoulement, whereby anyone who met the 
Geneva standard for asylum could not be returned to the country from which 
they were fleeing. The 1980 Refugee Act brought the U.S. in line with interna-
tional law, giving new impetus to a more rights-based approach to immigration 
and refugee policy. With the winding down of the Cold War in the late 1980’s and 
1990’s, only Cuba retained its special status as a communist country from which 
refugees would be accepted with almost no questions asked. However, the 
Mariel boat lift at the end of the Carter presidency in 1980 in which Fidel Castro 
opened the Cuban port of Mariel to a massive exodus (125,000 Cubans fled to 
the U.S., including a number of criminals and the mentally ill who were released 
from prisons and hospitals and allowed to join the exodus) forced the U.S. to 
rethink the blanket asylum policy for Cubans.
In 1979 Congress set up the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee 
Policy (SCIRP) under the direction of Lawrence Fuchs – the first such commission 
since the Dillingham Commission. As the SCIRP went about its work in the early 
1980’s, holding hearings, gathering data, and conducting research, immigration 
soared – not only legal immigration, already opened up as a result of the 1965 
INA, which made kinship and family ties the primary criterion for admission, 
but also illegal immigration. The 1965 INA repealed the National Origins Quota 
system, creating avenues for immigration from non-traditional sources, particu-
larly Latin America (Mexico), Asia, and eventually Africa and the Middle East. The 
INA also imposed numerical limits on the number of visas, including the first 
such limits on immigration from the Western Hemisphere (120,000 annually). 
These limitations would lead eventually to a big imbalance between the demand 
for and supply of visas. Rather than waiting in long queues that could last years, 
many immigrants chose to come illegally, either slipping across land and sea 
borders or coming on a tourist visa. The majority of illegal immigrants were (and 
are) visa “overstayers”, i.e. individuals who entered the country on a tourist visa 
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and simply remained in the US, melding into society, and joining a growing black 
market for labor. By the time the SCIRP made its recommendations to Congress, 
illegal immigration was the biggest policy issue; and the foreign born popula-
tion, as a percentage of the total population, was rapidly approaching a historic 
high. By 2008 foreigners constituted 14% of the total population — a level not 
seen since the early 20th century. Clearly immigration was reshaping American 
society, and immigrants were coming to play an increasingly important role 
in the economy. Policy debates in the 1990’s and 2000’s would evolve along 
four lines: 1)  Economic: what are the costs and benefits associated with high 
levels of immigration, especially illegal immigration? 2)  Social: how are the 
newcomers and their children (the second generation) assimilating?8 Are they 
learning English and are they succeeding in the labor market? 3) Political: will the 
newcomers be good citizens? Will they participate in politics, and if so, how? Will 
they be Democrats or Republicans, liberals or conservatives? Will they constitute 
a “swing vote?” And 4) security: with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 
(9-11), immigration and refugee policy was in the spotlight. Border enforcement 
and screening of persons wishing to enter the U.S. took on a new urgency. How 
did the terrorists enter the country? Was the 9-11 attack the result of lax border 
enforcement and an overly liberal immigration and refugee policy? Debates 
about terrorism and national security have intensified in the 2010’s with attacks 
by jihadi groups in major European cities — Madrid in 2004, London in 2005, 
Paris in 2015, and Brussels in 2016.
Yet despite the security concerns it was easier to stop or slow immigration 
and roll back the rights of foreigners and immigrants in earlier periods of history. 
In the era of rights-based politics, sealing the border, summarily deporting large 
numbers of immigrants (as happened during Operation Wetback in 1954), stopping 
family reunification, turning back refugees and asylum seekers, rolling back civil 
rights (due process and equal protection) for immigrants, and cutting their access 
to social services, is not so easy — recall the fate of Proposition 187 in California 
and despite calls by thirty one Republican governors in 2016 to restrict refugee 
resettlement from Syria and other Arab countries, immigration has continued.
Congress attempted to regain control of immigration, especially illegal immi-
gration, in 1986 with the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). IRCA also 
knows as the Simpson-Mazzoli Act, was the result of a compromise between 
“restrictionists”, those who wanted to stop illegal immigration, including 
Republicans led by Senator Alan Simpson of Wyoming and some southern 
Democrats, and “admissionists” those who wanted to legalize the large popula-
tion of illegal immigrants by granting them amnesty, including northern liberal 
Democrats, led by Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts. In the end a 
rights-markets coalition formed in the Senate and the House, and a compro-
mise was struck, allowing for the amnesty of illegals in exchange for sanctions 
(fines and imprisonment for repeat offenders) to be imposed on employers who 
knowingly hire illegal immigrants (Hollifield et al., 2008). The amnesty succeeded 
in bringing over 2.7 million illegals out of the shadows. To qualify for amnesty, 
illegals had to get certification that they were employed and that they had come 
8 By the 1990’s it was considered politically (and scientifically) incorrect to use the terms 
assimilation. American sociologists, like Portes (1990) prefer the term incorporation, 
which sees the process as a two-way street. See also Alba and Nee (2003).
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to the U.S. prior to January 1, 1982. Critics of the amnesty argued that it created 
a moral hazard. More people would be willing to take the risk of immigrating 
illegally on the assumption that they would be amnestied at a later point in time, 
and opponents of more liberal policies have argued that until the borders are 
secure there should be no expansion of rights for immigrants, legal, illegal or 
otherwise — this is the “enforcement only” approach to immigration reform.
Employer sanctions, on the other hand, represented the first attempt by the 
federal government to pursue an internal control strategy, using labor laws to 
control immigration. IRCA created the I-9 form, which requires all persons seeking 
employment to present documentary evidence that they are legal residents. But 
out of concern that the new law could lead to discrimination against foreign-
looking or foreign-sounding job applicants, provisions were inserted in IRCA to 
ensure that the rights of ethnic minorities would be protected — more evidence 
of the power of rights-based politics. Under IRCA, employers were not liable 
for hiring anyone who presented documents that “looked official”, and they 
were not required to verify the authenticity of documents. This loophole made 
employer sanctions very weak, and it led to the creation of a new black market 
for false papers, especially social security cards and drivers licenses. Concerns 
for privacy and civil liberties have prevented Congress from creating a national 
identification card, which is common in many other democracies. The American 
Civil Liberties Unions (ACLU) is strongly opposed to a national ID.
Agriculture posed a specific regulatory problem, because of the informality 
and seasonal nature of employment in this sector (Martin, 2009). In the run-up 
to the passage of IRCA, growers lobbied for a guest worker program (again 
visions of the Virginia model), but labor unions, especially the United Farm 
Workers of America (UFW), co-founded by the charismatic labor leader, César 
Chávez, opposed what they considered a system of bonded labor. The result 
was the creation of a Special Agricultural Worker (SAW) legalization program 
under which 750,000 mostly Mexican farm workers were amnestied. Finally with 
respect to the impact of IRCA on overall levels of immigration, it is important to 
remember that each person covered by the amnesty was able to bring relatives 
(spouses, parents, brothers, and sisters) into the U.S. under the family reunifica-
tion provisions of the 1965 INA.
The IRCA did little to slow the pace of illegal immigration into the US. 
Over the course of the 1990’s and into the first decade of the 21st century, 
illegal would come to rival legal immigration, setting the stage for a backlash 
against all immigrants; first came Proposition 187 in California (1994), then 
IIRAIRA (1996), which were discussed at the beginning of this chapter, leading 
to the Sensenbrenner Bill (2005) and contemporary debates over what to do 
about an illegal population, which reached a peak of around 12 million in 2007 
(Passel, 2009 and Figure 3). It is important to keep in mind, however, that not 
all immigration is illegal, and not all is unwanted (unskilled). Illegal immigration 
dominates the headlines and there are powerful anti-immigration lobbies, like 
the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) that seek drastically 
to reduce immigration; but there are equally powerful pro-immigrant lobbies, 
some of them like the Mexican American Legal Defense Fund (MALDEF) and 
LULAC are devoted to defending the rights and interests of Latinos. Still others 
like the American Chamber of Commerce and various trade associations 
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represent powerful business interests. Bill Gates, the founder and former head 
of Microsoft, organized a successful lobbying campaign by high-tech industries 
to stop Congress from restricting high-skilled immigration at the time of debate 
(1995-1996) over the IIRAIRA.
Figure 2: Legal versus Illegal Immigration
Source: Passel and Suro (2005).
We might expect Congress to restrict or slow immigration during economic 
hard times; but at the start of the relatively mild recession of 1990-1991, 
Congress enacted another expansive immigration reform (Hollifield et al., 2008). 
The Immigration Act of 1990 was designed to reform legal immigration, setting 
an overall annual ceiling of 675,000. Because of family reunification and the fact 
that visas not used in one year can be carried over to the next, actual levels of 
legal immigration are much higher, averaging over 1 million/year throughout the 
1990’s and into the 2000’s. Many illegals are also able to “adjust their status” and 
become legal permanent residents (LPRs or green card holders), thus adding to 
the annual totals. The Pew Hispanic Center (Passel, 2009) estimates that over 
300,000 people immigrated to the U.S. illegally each year from 1990 to 2004 
(see Figure 2). In fact the US immigration system relies heavily on adjustments 
of status to deal with enormous backlogs of individuals who find themselves in 
legal limbo; and this “adjustment of status” system creates a demand for immi-
gration lawyers and other specialists who advise millions of immigrants and 
potential immigrants, as well as their employers. The American Bar Association 
(ABA), specifically the American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA), 
is among the most important pro-immigration interest groups. Lawyers are 
essential for the smooth functioning of the system, because they help to adjudi-
cate and manage hundreds of thousands of cases on an annual basis. This gives 
the American system for managing immigration greater flexibility to deal with 
admissions on a case by case basis, even though quotas and quantitative caps 
on the numbers of visas available for specific nationalities and regions make 
the system cumbersome and inefficient (Hollifield, Martin and Orrenius, 2015). 
The highly individualized nature of this regulatory system is consistent with 
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the broader trend in rights-based politics and policy, which began with the civil 
rights movement of the 1950’s and 1960’s.
Figure 3: Recent Trends in Illegal Immigration
Source: Pew Hispanic Center.
The 1990 Immigration Act created a new category of visas (the H1-B) for 
highly skilled immigrants, thus adding an important economic and human 
capital (as opposed to family and humanitarian) dimension to US policy, and 
generating more work for lawyers who specialize in helping employers recruit 
individuals with skills that match their company needs. The 1990 Act set an 
annual cap on H1-B’s of 65,000, but during the high-tech boom of the late 1990’s 
Congress adjusted the cap in response to higher demand for skilled workers 
and pressure from business groups. The H1-B visa was designed for high-skilled 
immigrants, and the H2-A and H2-B visas were created for non-agricultural 
seasonal workers. But the number of job-based green cards, whether for the 
unskilled (capped at 10,000/year) or the skilled (capped at 140,000/year), was 
too low to accommodate the overall demand for immigrant labor (see Figure 4). 
Throughout the boom years of the 1990’s and into the 2000’s, the result was the 
issuance of more temporary visas (over 600,000 in FY 2005) and rising levels of 
illegal immigration. It is difficult for Congress to create an employment-based 
visa system that mirrors the business cycle and perfectly matches the needs of 
the labor market. With the bursting of the high-tech bubble in 2001, the demand 
for H1-B’s declined and a binding cap of 65,000 was brought back in 2004, only 
to see demand rise again in 2004-2007. The bursting of the housing bubble 
in 2008 and the ensuing financial crisis led to declining demand for unskilled 
immigrant workers, especially in construction; and unemployment reached 10% 
of the labor force as a whole in 2009. Immigration does not follow the business 
cycle, because of lags between the demand for and supply of visas, the difficul-




Figure 4: H-1 B Visa for High Skilled – Petitions Approved for Initial Employment) (Thousand)
Source: Department of Homeland Security.
To combat illegal immigration in the 1990’s, the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) developed ever more sophisticated strategies for border enforce-
ment (external control), increasing the number of border patrol agents and rede-
ploying them at critical entry points along the US-Mexico border. Operations 
Hold the Line in Texas (1993) and Gatekeeper in California (1994) were designed 
to seal the border in urban areas like El Paso and San Diego, and to force illegal 
crossings away from the cities into remote, desert areas. These external enforce-
ment policies succeeded in redirecting flows, but levels of illegal immigration 
continued to rise; and thousands of illegals would die in the deserts of the 
southwest, leading some to argue that the policies of the Clinton administra-
tion were nothing more than symbolic and cynical attempts to show the public 
that the government was regaining control of the border – an “out of sight, out 
of mind” approach to immigration control – but with deadly consequences for 
the migrants themselves (Cornelius, 2001). The failure of external enforcement 
policies in the 1990’s combined with the 9-11 terrorist attacks, led to a massive 
reorganization of border control. In 2003 the INS, formerly an agency of the 
Department of Justice, was reorganized into two agencies  – one for enforce-
ment, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and one for services, 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) – and placed in the new Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS). A third agency, Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP), was created to coordinate border control. All three agencies were tasked 
with protecting the US homeland from another terrorist attack, as the security 
function of immigration and refugee policy came to the fore (Rudolph, 2006). 
The Real ID Act, passed in 2005, established new standards for driver’s licenses 
and non-compulsory state ID cards, to make it more difficult to counterfeit these 
documents and for individuals to obtain false papers. The law was intended to 
reinforce checks on individual identity, stopping short of creating a national ID 
card.
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The new emphasis on security made travel and immigration to the U.S. more 
difficult, especially for anyone coming from a Muslim country; and the issuance 
of visas in US consulates around the world came under much greater scrutiny, 
slowing an already cumbersome and inefficient process with elaborate back-
ground checks for visa applicants and refugees – it takes on average two years 
to process individual asylum claims. Overworked Foreign Service Officers (the 
front line of immigration control) were fearful of admitting someone who might 
carry out another terrorist attack. The 9-11 hijackers entered the U.S. legally on 
tourist and student visas, but seven of the nineteen had false passports and three 
were on terrorist watch lists, leading the 9-11 Commission – set up to investigate 
the attacks – to conclude that better immigration and border enforcement might 
have prevented the terrorists from entering the country. Security considerations 
aside, the debate over immigration reform during the George W. Bush adminis-
tration (2000-2008), as in previous eras, revolved primarily around the economic 
effects of immigration, especially illegal immigration (Borjas, 1999). In May, 2006 
Bush proposed “comprehensive immigration reform”, to match “willing workers 
with willing employers”, by creating a new guest worker program (a return to the 
Virginia model) and an “earned legalization” program for the millions of illegals 
already working in the U.S. (visions of the Pennsylvania model). Opponents of 
comprehensive reform charged that it would be a repeat of the IRCA amnesty, 
creating another situation of moral hazard that would lead to yet higher levels of 
illegal immigration. The rallying cry of opponents was “fool me once, shame on 
you, fool me twice, shame on me!” The Sensenbrenner Bill of 2005-2006 repre-
sented an alternative, enforcement only” strategy, placing a premium on enfor-
cement of existing laws, reinforced border control, the arrest and deportation of 
the millions of illegals, and the criminalization of illegal immigration.
But, the collapse of the reform effort in 2006 led many state and local govern-
ments to take up the cause of immigration control, further dividing communities 
and the electorate. It was impossible to resurrect the rights-markets coalitions 
in Congress that enacted earlier reforms during the cold war period (Hollifield 
et al., 2008). The Republican Party in particular was divided between a cultu-
rally conservative – nativist and xenophobic – wing, which refused to compro-
mise, and a more moderate, business-oriented wing (led by future presidential 
candidate, Senator John McCain), which wanted to give the Grand Old Party 
(GOP) a more immigrant-friendly face. The fear among many Republicans, like 
George W. Bush’s political “Svengali”, Karl Rove, was that demographic changes 
resulting from high levels of immigration were changing the electorate, and that 
Hispanics in particular constituted a swing vote in many key states and districts. 
Some leaders of the GOP did not want to end up once again on the “wrong side 
of history”, as in the 1920’s when the Republicans ceded third-wave immigrants 
to the Democratic Party for the better part of two generations. In the run-up 
to the 2008 presidential election and flush from their successes in the 2006 
mid-term elections, Democratic leaders in Congress decided against compro-
mise with moderate Republicans, like Senator John McCain, and the Bush White 
House, preferring instead to leave the immigration issue open, like a festering 
wound, and to use it against Republicans in the presidential elections of 2008 
and 2012. The question remains to what extent immigration is an issue driving 
American politics and how the fourth-wave immigrants have altered the course 
of American political development?
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The Messy Politics of Assimilation
Arguments about the assimilation, integration or incorporation of fourth-
wave immigrants abound. Two things are clear, however: the United States is 
more ethnically diverse than ever before in its history — Latin Americans and 
Asians have replaced Europeans as the dominant immigrant groups  — and 
immigrants have spread geographically across the country. Rather than concen-
trating in traditional immigrant cities, like New York, Boston, and Miami on the 
east coast, Chicago and Saint Louis in the mid-west, or San Francisco and Los 
Angeles in the west and Houston in the southwest, immigrants are settling in 
new “gateway cities” (like Dallas-Fort Worth, Atlanta, Phoenix, Washington, 
DC, Charlotte, Nashville, and Las Vegas to name a few) and in states and cities 
far from the main ports of entry (Singer et al., 2008). Looking at the last two 
censuses (1990 and 2000), states with the fastest growing immigrant popula-
tions were in the south (North and South Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee, and 
Arkansas), the west (Nevada, Utah, and Washington), and non-traditional desti-
nations in the east (New Hampshire and Pennsylvania) and mid-west (Iowa and 
Wisconsin). Overall immigrants accounted for 30% of US population growth 
from 1980 to 2010. The four biggest immigration states in 2010 were California 
(10  million foreign born), New York (4  million), and Texas and Florida (over 
3 million each). The leading countries of origin in the fourth wave were Mexico 
(31% of the foreign-born), followed by the Philippines, India, China, and Vietnam 
(Pew Hispanic Center, 2009).
Figure 5: Immigrant Origins have shifted to Latin America and Asia 
(% of Foreign-born Population)
Source: Department of Homeland Security.
The fact that so many of the newcomers are of Latin American and Asian 
origin has increased the visibility of immigrants across the country, giving 
greater impetus to debates about assimilation. Mexican and Central American 
immigrants in particular are predominantly unskilled, many are illegals, and they 
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often speak little or no English (Passel, 2009); hence the concerns expressed 
by Samuel Huntington and others (Skerry, 1995) for American national identity 
(the unum). Many of these newcomers – much like their counterparts a century 
earlier  – live in ethnic enclaves in large cities. While the first generation may 
experience significant improvements in their welfare (compared to their 
situation in the country of origin), their children, the second generation, may 
experience significant downward mobility – what the sociologist, Portes, termed 
“segmented assimilation” (Portes and Rumbaut, 1990; also Fitzgerald, 2014), 
which is non-linear and does not lead to “mainstream” outcomes. The theory 
purports to explain why many second generation immigrants engage in deviant 
or criminal behavior, joining gangs or terrorist organizations, for example. It 
is important to note that this is not a new phenomenon — visions of the anar-
chists at the turn of the 20th century or the film of the 1960’s, West Side Story! 
Apart from debates over assimilation, the cost of educating immigrant children 
and providing health care for indigent families have become central features of 
debates about the fiscal impacts of immigration (Borjas, 1999; Martin, 2014). But 
given the rapidly declining percentage of the native-born work force with less 
than a high school education (for men this number fell from over 50% in 1960 
to less than 10% in 2004  —a great success of mass-based public education), 
unskilled immigrants fill a niche at the low end of the labor market (see Figure 5 
and Passel, 2009; Orrenius and Solomon, 2006).
Figure 6: Immigrant Workers Overrepresented at Extremes 
of the Education Distribution (%)
Source : American Community Survey (2014).
High levels of unskilled and illegal immigration have provoked intense 
debates among economists over the long-term costs and benefits of immigra-
tion, with some (Borjas, 1999) arguing that the service-based, high-tech US 
economy no longer needs so many unskilled and poorly educated immigrants; 
while others (Orrenius and Solomon, 2006) point out that key sectors of the 
economy (agriculture, construction, consumer services such as restaurants and 
289
American Immigration Politics
hotels, and health care to name a few) would suffer without access to immigrant 
labor. Critics counter that without immigrants, wages for native-born workers 
would rise significantly and the jobs would still get done. This assumes that 
immigrant workers are substitutes for the native-born, and vice-versa; rather 
than complements, as some would argue. Alan Greenspan, former Chair of the 
Federal Reserve Board, weighed into the debate, arguing that immigration keeps 
inflation down (by keeping wages and prices in check), and that high skilled 
immigrants in particular are a boon for the US economy (Martin, 2014).9
Not all immigrants are unskilled and illegal, especially those from Asia, who 
often come with much needed skills (Filipino nurses and Indian doctors, for 
example) and high levels of human capital (the foreign-born share of US scien-
tists and engineers is large and increasing). These highly skilled immigrants 
enter at the top of the labor market and in a short period of time their earnings 
rapidly surpass those of natives (see Figure 6 and Chiswick, 2008). Immigrants 
also have high levels of entrepreneurial activity, with a willingness to work 
long hours at low pay, accumulating capital, reinvesting it, and in the process 
creating new jobs for immigrants and natives alike — a rising tide that lifts all 
boats (Martin, 2014). Certain immigrant groups, like the Koreans and Iranians, 
for example, have exceptionally high levels of self-employment, 28% and 20% 
respectively, which is much higher than among the native-born (13%). Clearly 
fourth-wave immigrants are highly diverse, not only in ethno-cultural terms, but 
in terms of social class, education, and economic achievement (Pew Hispanic 
Center, 2009).
Not surprisingly, rates of naturalization vary significantly from one group 
to another. Already in the 1980’s there was concern that the new immigrants 
were not naturalizing, and that the extension of so many rights to immigrants 
had led to a “devaluation of citizenship” (Schuck and Smith, 1985); but with the 
political backlash against immigration in the mid-1990’s (Proposition 187 and 
IIRAIRA) and the fact that those amnestied by IRCA in 1987-1988 had become 
eligible for citizenship, the INS was overwhelmed with millions of applica-
tions for naturalization, leading the legal scholar Schuck (1998) to announce 
the “revaluation of citizenship”. Naturalization rates are highest among those 
groups with little prospect of returning to their home country. Refugees, like 
the Vietnamese and the Iranians, have very high rates of naturalization, a trend 
that is reinforced by the fact that they tend to be highly educated and in higher 
income brackets. Mexicans and Central Americans at the other extreme tend to 
be poorly educated, they have a higher propensity to return home, and since 
1998 Mexicans are allowed to have dual nationality. All these factors have led 
to lower rates of naturalization among Hispanic immigrants, but the rates have 
been going up steadily since the mid-1990’s, reaching into the 30% range for 
Mexican LPRs (green card holders) by 2005. Of course these numbers do not 
take into account the large number of illegals, who are not eligible for naturaliza-
tion (Skerry, 1995; Jones-Correa, 1998; Pickus, 2005).
Although Hispanics constitute one of the fastest growing demographic 
groups in US society (55.4 million strong and 17.4% of the total US population in 
9 “Greenspan Backs Increase in Foreign Skilled Workers”, Wall Street Journal, April 30, 
2009.
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2014), they have low rates of naturalization and many are illegal; therefore they 
are ineligible to vote. Even among those who are eligible and registered to vote, 
their participation rate has been among the lowest of any major ethnic group 
(de la Garza and Desipio, 2005; Desipio, 1996). Of those who voted in the 2012 
presidential election, whites accounted for 72% of the electorate, blacks 13%, 
Hispanics 10%, and Asians 3%. This is the lowest share ever for whites. Yet whites 
still have high participation rates (64% in 2012) compared to blacks (66%) and 
Hispanics (48%), even though both minority groups have been voting in higher 
numbers in recent elections. The GOP made significant inroads among Hispanic 
voters in two of the last four presidential elections, jumping from 21% for Dole in 
1996, to 31% for Bush in 2000, and 44% for Bush in 2004. But this trend reversed 
itself in 2008, as John McCain  – despite his early support for comprehensive 
immigration reform- received only 32% of the Hispanic vote, and Mitt Romney 
in 2012 received a paltry 27%. The percentage of Hispanics identifying with the 
GOP, after reaching a high of 28% in 2004-2006, slipped back to 23% in 2007, and 
has hovered in the mid-20% range. Hispanics identifying with the Democratic 
Party, on the other hand, leapt from 49% in 2006 to 57% in 2007 and holding 
today at around 50% (Lopez and Taylor, 2009). No doubt some of the decline in 
Hispanic support for the GOP can be attributed to the divisive effects of the failed 
immigration reforms of 2005-2006, particularly the Sensenbrenner bill, which 
provoked large street demonstrations, and to heightened anti-immigration 
rhetoric from Republican candidates in both congressional and especially pres-
idential elections – Mitt Romney in 2014 argued that with tougher immigration 
laws, illegal immigrants would “self deport”, and the Republican nominee for 
President in 2016, Donald Trump, has called for building a wall along the entire 
US-Mexican border and for a ban on all Muslim immigration to the U.S. The 
rallying cry of Hispanics (“¡Hoy marchamos, mañana votamos!”) has not led to 
dramatic increases in Hispanic voter registration or turnout.
Nonetheless immigration is gradually transforming American politics. 
Hispanic voters made a difference in the presidential elections of 2008 and 2012. 
The biggest breakthrough came in Florida where in 2012 Obama carried 60% of 
the Hispanic vote, compared with 56% for Bush in 2004. Obama also improved 
the share of the Democratic vote among Hispanics in other swing states, like 
Colorado, Nevada, and New Mexico; thus giving the Democrats an edge in the 
presidential as well as congressional elections. Similar trends can be observed 
in other important states, like California, New Jersey, and Texas. But immigration 
as an issue in national elections only affects voting at the margins. The economy 
-basic pocket  – book issues like employment and taxation  – dominated the 
election followed by war and peace issues, with immigration trailing far behind 
among the electorate as a whole, except among Hispanic voters in certain swing 
states and districts. The only presidential candidate who made immigration 
control the centerpiece of his primary campaign, the Republican Tom Tancredo, 
got nowhere. If anything Tancredo hurt the Republican ticket (McCain-Palin) in 
the general elections by alienating Hispanic voters; moreover, those congres-
sional candidates in 2008 who took a hard-line stand on immigration did not fare 
well, most of them losing by significant margins, and the same pattern repeated 




Clearly the biggest immigration issue in American politics going forward 
(the elephant in the room) is the fate of some 12 million illegal immigrants (see 
Figure 7) who contribute their labor to the US economy but pose a challenge to 
state sovereignty and security (control of borders/territory is a central attribute 
of sovereignty and vital to security), rule of law (it is illegal for employers to 
hire individuals not authorized to work), and civil society (large numbers of indi-
viduals living in the shadows at the edges of society is detrimental to the social 
fabric). What to do about this segment of the immigrant population and how 
to reform immigration policy (how many immigrants should be admitted, from 
where, and in what status?) are big, unresolved questions that have consumed 
the Obama administration and will bedevil his successor. The former Democratic 
Speaker of the House of Representatives, Tip O’Neill, when pushed by some 
of his colleagues to bring the 1986 IRCA to the House floor for a vote, said 
“gentlemen, immigration is political death”. O’Neill feared that if you open the 
issue for debate, everyone will be angry and no one will go away happy. Despite 
O’Neill’s reservations, the 1986 bill did come to the floor, and it narrowly passed. 
In 2016 immigration is even more controversial and divisive than in 1986, but 
candidates cannot afford to tread lightly around the issue.
Figure 7: Unauthorized Population almost as Large as Permanent Resident Population
Source: Pew Research Center estimates for 2012 based on augmented American 
Community Survey data from IPUMS.
President Obama faced a choice of kicking the can (in this case immigra-
tion reform) down the road or opening a divisive political debate. He chose to 
double down on border enforcement, deporting by far more people than any 
president in history, and try to bring relief to some illegals by protecting them 
from deportation through executive actions like DACA and DAPA (see above). 
Obama may have alienated some of his new Hispanic constituents  – during 
the 2008 campaign he promised them that he would propose comprehensive 
immigration reform during the first year of his presidency, but his advisers 
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convinced him that this would be futile, given Republican intransigence. He 
vowed to pursue reform that would make immigration orderly and legal and to 
find a “pathway to citizenship” for illegal immigrants, but he was forced to back 
away from these promises.
Conclusion: The Liberal Paradox
Like other democracies, the United States is trapped in a “liberal” paradox10 – 
in order to maintain economic competitiveness, the U.S. must keep its economy 
open to trade, foreign investment, and immigration. But immigration, unlike 
trade in goods and services, or the movement of capital, involves greater 
political risks. The liberal paradox highlights some of the risks and contradictions 
inherent in US immigration policy. As with any sovereign nation, it is essential 
for the United States to maintain control of its borders (a degree of political and 
legal closure); otherwise the government risks undermining the social contract 
and rule of law, cheapening citizenship, and deepening the political and social 
divide. The central challenge therefore is to maintain openness while at the same 
time protecting the rights of individuals-citizens as well as denizens.
In the 21st century managing migration is a central function of the modern 
state, and the state must make strategic choices about how many immigrants 
to accept, from where, and with what status (Hollifield, 2004). From the end of 
World War II until the recession of 2008, immigration in the United States has 
been increasing. In 2009, the foreign population stands at a historic high of 
36 million (14% of the total population) and climbing. The rise in immigration is 
a function of market forces (demand-pull and supply-push) and kinship (family) 
networks, which reduce the transactions costs of immigration. Economic and 
sociological forces are the necessary conditions for immigration to occur, but 
the sufficient conditions are legal and political. States must be willing to accept 
immigration and to grant rights to outsiders. How then can a liberal democracy, 
like the United States, regulate immigration in the face of economic forces that 
push it toward greater openness, while security concerns and powerful political 
forces push it toward closure?
Historically US immigration policy has been driven by three concerns, 
epitomized by the Massachusetts, Virginia, and Pennsylvania models. The first 
(Massachusetts) revolves around concerns for national identity, cultural and 
ideological cohesion (the Unum). To what extent is the United States a White 
Anglo-Saxon Protestant nation and how much diversity (pluribus) is acceptable? 
The second (Virginia model) is primarily concerned about the need for adequate 
supplies of labor and human capital in a dynamic and fast-growing economy. 
The third (Pennsylvania model) is open to diversity, tolerant of differences, but 
stresses respect for the values and ideals of the Republic. We continue to see 
each of these ideas at work in debates over immigration reform.
10 I advanced the notion of a liberal paradox in Hollifield (1992) to explain the dilemmas 
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American Immigration Politics: An Unending Controversy
Immigration has been a controversial issue throughout American political 
history from the colonial period to the present. In this article I argue that we 
must understand how the issue of immigration is framed whether in terms 
of economics (markets), rights, security or culture, and we must be attentive 
always to place the controversy in historical context. In the period since 1945 
until the 2001 terrorist attacks, immigration policy was driven by a rights-markets 
dynamic. But in the first decades of the 21st century the immigration debate 
is framed primarily in terms of culture (religion and race) as well as national 
security. This framing has heightened the “liberal paradox” making immigration 
policy reform more difficult.
Les politiques américaines de l’immigration : 
une controverse sans fin
L’immigration a toujours été un sujet à controverse dans l’histoire politique 
américaine, depuis l’époque coloniale jusqu’à aujourd’hui. Dans cet article, 
l’auteur démontre comment cette question de l’immigration est tantôt construite 
en fonction de l’économie, tantôt des droits, de la sécurité ou de la culture et 
qu’il est nécessaire de replacer cette analyse dans un contexte historique précis. 
Durant la période qui va de 1945 aux attaques terroristes de 2001, la politique 
d’immigration a été définie en fonction du jeu entre droit et économie. Mais 
depuis le début du XXIe siècle, les termes du débat sur l’immigration aux États-
Unis se concentrent autour d’une rhétorique relative à la culture (race et religion) 
et à la sécurité nationale. Ce cadre de pensée conduit à intensifier le « paradoxe 
libéral » compliquant ainsi toute réforme de la politique d’immigration.
Políticas de inmigración estadounidenses: 
una controversia sin fin
La inmigración siempre ha sido un tema controvertido en la historia política 
estadounidense, desde la época colonial hasta la actualidad. En este artículo, 
el autor muestra como el tema de la inmigración se construye en algunas 
ocasiones en función de la economía, y en otras de los derechos, de la seguridad 
o de la cultura; y como es necesario poner este análisis en su contexto histórico 
exacto. En el período de 1945 a los ataques terroristas de 2001, la política de 
inmigración se ha definido en función de la interacción entre el derecho y la 
economía. Sin embargo, desde el principio del siglo XXI, los términos del 
debate sobre la inmigración en los Estados Unidos se concentran alrededor de 
una retórica sobre la cultura (raza y religión) y sobre la seguridad nacional. Este 
marco de pensamiento conduce a intensificar la «paradoja liberal» que complica 
cualquier reforma de la política de inmigración.
